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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this
appeal under U.C.A. §§78-2a-3(2)(i) and Rule 3(a) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.

This appeal is from the order of

the District Court entered on January 23, 1995 directing that all
prior orders of the Court were final and there was no just reason
for delay under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Whether Mrs. Hammond (now known and hereinafter

referred to as "Mrs. Dennison") has shown by clear and convincing
evidence that Mr. Hammond is in contempt of any court order.
Applicable Standard of Review:

The trial court's legal

conclusion that defendant is in contempt of court is reviewed for
correctness and is given no special deference on appeal.
v. Long, 844 P.2d 381 (Utah App. 1992).

State

The findings of fact are

given great deference in divorce cases and the appellate court
does not overturn them unless they are clearly erroneous.
v. Richie, 784 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1989).

Richie

A finding of fact is

clearly erroneous if it violates the standards set by the
appellate court, is against the clear weight of the evidence, or,
the reviewing court is "left with a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed" even though there is evidence
to support the finding.

Cumminas v. Cumminqs, 821 P.2d 472, 476

(Utah App. 1991).
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II.

Whether the court erred in ordering Mr. Hammond to

pay Mrs. Dennison $505.05 per month for a period of 218
consecutive months and to serve 3 0 days in jail for his contempt.
Applicable Standard of Review: The trial court's
judgment is a matter of law and conclusions of law are review for
correctness and are given no special deference on appeal.
Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065 (Utah App. 1994).

The trial

court has discretion to require Mr. Hammond to serve 30 days in
jail for his contempt and said discretion will be upheld absent
manifest injustice or inequity that indicates an abuse of
discretion.

Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818 (Utah App. 1992).

III.

Whether the trial court erred in denying Mr.

Hammond's motion to dismiss.
Applicable Standard of Review:

Said motion was argued

at the conclusion of Mrs. Dennison's case at the hearing on
October 15, 1993.

(R. 674). In ruling on a motion to dismiss,

the trial court is obligated to look at the evidence and all
reasonable inferences that fairly may be drawn therefrom in the
light favorable to the party moved against and determine if
plaintiff has convincingly shown a right to relief and on appeal
the reviewing court looks at the evidence in the same manner.
Johnson v. Bell. 666 P.2d 308 (Utah 1983).
IV.

Whether Mrs. Dennison should be awarded attorney's

fees.
Applicable Standard of Review:

The trial court has

discretion to so require and said discretion will be upheld
2

absent manifest injustice or inequity that indicates an abuse of
discretion.

Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818 (Utah App. 1992).
APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Persons against whom action for contempt may be
brought:
U.C.A. §78-32-1(5) (1993):
The following acts or omissions in respect to a
court or proceedings therein are contempts of the
authority of the court:
. . . .

(5) Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or
process of the court.
Power of the court to punish for contempt:
U.C.A. §78-7-17(2) (1993):
Every judicial officer has power:
. . . .

(2) to compel obedience to his lawful orders
as provided by law.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On or about March 23, 1993 Mrs. Dennison commenced the
instant proceedings by filing her Verified Motion for Order to
Show Cause. (R. 293 - 312) . Said motion requested the following
relief:
a. For judgment in the amount of $1,515.15
representing Mrs. Dennison's share of the HHEICO
payments for January, February and March, 1993.
b. For an order requiring Mr. Hammond to give
Mrs. Dennison a copy of the HHEICO contract and all
documents relating thereto.
c. For an order requiring Mr. Hammond to sign
necessary documents to allow the obligors on the HHEICO
contract to pay Mrs. Dennison directly.

3

d. For judgment in the amount of $453.34
representing Mr. Hammond's share of unpaid medical
bills.
e. For judgment in the amount of $937.50
representing one-half of the children's orthodontia
expenses.
f. For judgment in the amount of $400.00
representing Mrs. Dennison's share of the sale proceeds
of the Pontiac automobile.
g. For an Order finding Mr. Hammond in contempt
of the provisions of the Decree of Divorce.
h.

For an award of attorney's fees and costs.

(R. 295).
The Order to Show Cause was heard by Commissioner
Arnett and on June 11, 1993 Mr. Hammond objected thereto.

(R.

322-323) . After hearing the arguments of counsel on August 11,
1993 in regard thereto the Court ruled, among other things, that
the decree did not restrict Mr. Hammond from selling the
contract, however, the issue of contempt with regard to whether
the note was discounted inappropriately was reserved for trial.
The written order regarding the hearing on August 11, 1993 was
not submitted to or signed by the trial court.

(R. 355 and 487).

Accordingly, some of said issues remain pending and some of said
issues were included in the order entered on December 13, 1994.
(R. 590).
On February 8, 1994 Mr. Hammond file an Objection to
and Motion to Alter or Amend Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, Order and Judgment, or, in the Alternative, Motion for New
Trial.
1994.

(R. 415). A hearing was held on said motion on April 11,
(R. 466). On May 16, 1994 the trial court ruled that the
4

trial should be re-opened "for the limited purpose of hearing
evidence concerning whether the defendant had the right under the
Decree to encumber the HHEICO contract, whether he had the right
to encumber the contract without the consent of plaintiff, and
whether his conduct of pledging the HHEICO contract without the
plaintiff's consent constitutes contempt of court."

(R. 486).

Said trial was held on August 31, 1994 and the order in
regard thereto was entered on December 13, 1994. (R. 524 and
590).

On January 23, 1995 the trial court entered its order

which determined that there was no just reason for delay and
directed that the prior orders and judgments were final.

(R.

615) .
The following facts are divided into numbered
paragraphs to make reference thereto more convenient:
1.

The Decree of Divorce between Mr. Hammond and Mrs.

Dennison was entered on May 21, 1991.
2.

(R. 268).

The only language in the Decree of Divorce

regarding the HHEICO contract is as follows:

"The plaintiff is

awarded sixty-five percent (65%) of the net proceeds of the
HHEICO contract and the defendant is awarded thirty-five percent
(35%) of the net proceeds of the HHEICO contract.

The current

net proceeds from the HHEICO contract are $777.00 per.(sic)

The

plaintiff is entitled to receive $505.05 per month and the
defendant is entitled to receive $271.95 per month from the
HHEICO contract.

In the event that the net amount received from

the HHEICO contract shall differ from the $777.00 per month, then
5

the parties shall divide the net proceeds sixty-five percent
(65%) to the plaintiff and thirty-five percent (35%) to the
defendant."
3.

(R. 268-275).
An All-inclusive Promissory Note Secured by All-

inclusive Trust Deed dated May 29, 1990 from Robert S. Nichol and
Sandra Kistler to Mr. Hammond is the document which is referred
to as the HHEICO contract.
4.

(R. 63 6 and 717).

Said note also sets forth the terms of an

obligation on which Mr. Hammond is the sole obligor and C & N
Investments is the obligee which obligation is also secured by a
senior trust deed against the same property.
5.

(R. 368-369).

The Decree of Divorce does not contain any language

which restricts Mr. Hammond from selling, transferring or
encumbering the HHEICO contract.
6.

(R. 268-275).

On November 3, 1992 Mr. Hammond borrowed $25,000.00

from David Moench which was secured by giving Mr. Moench an
assignment of the HHEICO contract which assignment included an
option for the HHEICO contract to be assigned back to Mr. Hammond
upon payment of the loan.

(R. 722 and 744) .

7.

Said loan was due in full on January 3, 1993.

(R.

8.

The purpose of said loan was to use the proceeds in

731) .

such a fashion that Mr. Hammond could obtain sufficient funds to
repay the Moench loan and also to purchase the interest of his
son-in-law and daughter in the marital residence which Mr.
Hammond and a minor child of the parties shared with the son-in6

law and daughter so that the residence of Mr. Hammond and the
minor child would not have to be sold.
9.

(R. 720-722).

The loan proceeds were paid directly from Mr.

Moench to Mr. LaRoy Orr pursuant to a loan agreement between Mr.
Hammond to Mr. Orr which provided that said loan together with an
additional $10,000.00 was to be paid to Mr. Hammond on or before
January 3, 1993.

Said loan proceeds were to be used for the

purchase of land and not in any other manner.

(R. 722-723 and

759-760).
10.

Before making the loan to Mr. Orr, Mr. Hammond

talked with several of Mr. Hammond's friends who knew Mr. Orr and
was assured that Mr. Orr would perform as he promised.
11.

(R. 723).

At the time that Mr. Hammond obtained the loan, he

had just gone through a couple of periods of unemployment and he
had no other means to purchase the interest of his son-in-law and
daughter in order to provide a stable residence for the minor
child.

(R. 720-721).
12.

On or about December 15, 1993 when Mr. Hammond

learned that Mr. Orr was not going to perform as he promised, Mr.
Hammond obtained an extension from Mr. Moench and attempted to
obtain a loan so that he could pay Mr. Moench as required.

(R.

726 and 728).
13.

Mr. Hammond was unable to pay Mr. Moench as

required and Mr. Moench assumed possession of the HHEICO contract
and the payments pursuant thereto. Mr. Hammond no longer has any
right, interest or claim to the HHEICO contract.
7

(R. 727).

14.

Mr. Hammond did not intend to lose his rights,

interest and claim in the HHEICO contract or that Mrs. Dennison
would not receive her portion of the net proceeds.
15.

Mr. Hammond has not received any proceeds pursuant

to the HHEICO contract since December, 1993.
16.

(R. 730) .

(R. 730-731).

In opposition to the Order to Show Cause Mr.

Hammond submitted an affidavit explaining, among other things,
that Mr. Hammond had provided all of the support for the two
minor children of the parties; that one of the two minor children
had resided with him since the divorce decree; that the other
minor child had lived at a separate residence until her marriage;
and that Mr. Hammond was not receiving any proceeds from the
document referred to as the HHEICO contract.
17.

(R. 317-320).

In Mr. Hammond's objection to the commissioner's

recommendation he explained that he was not in any way restricted
by the Decree of Divorce from assigning or selling the HHEICO
contract and, since he no longer had an interest in said
contract, there was no obligation to make payments to Mrs.
Dennison as though he was receiving monthly payments pursuant to
said contract.
18.

(R. 325-326).
Mrs. Dennison filed a Response to Objection to

Commissioner's Recommendation and, in regard to the HHEICO
contract, argued that in contravention of the Decree of Divorce,
Mr. Hammond had assigned and encumbered the HHEICO contract so
that Mrs. Dennison was no longer being paid a monthly amount.
(R. 332).
8

19.

In Mr. Hammond's Reply in Support of Objection to

Commissioner's Recommendation, Mr. Hammond again explained that
there was no contravention in the Decree of Divorce against his
assigning or transferring the HHEICO contract and that Mrs.
Dennison's right pursuant to the Decree of Divorce is a right to
a portion of the net proceeds if there are any net proceeds.

(R.

339) .
20.

Mr. Hammond's Objection to Commissioner's

Recommendation, Mrs. Dennison's Response to Objection to
Commissioner's Recommendation and Mr. Hammond's Reply in Support
of Objection to Commissioner's Recommendation were filed with the
Court prior to the hearing on Mr. Hammond's objection to the
recommendation and courtesy copies of the above were provided to
the Court.

(R. 433).

21.

After the hearing on August 11, 1993 the Court

ruled as follows:
With regard to the HHEICO contract, first, it
appears to me the Decree did not restrict Mr. Hammond
from selling the contract, although clearly the
contract provided for an income stream and it may have
been contemplated that that would be an asset that
would continue on. It seems to me at a minimum, that
Mrs. Hammond is entitled to 65 percent of the value —
well, of the net proceeds from the sale of that note.
With regard to whether the note was discounted
inappropriately in violation of the Decree and what was
implicit in that Decree, it seems to me that there is
not sufficient evidence before the Court to make a
determination as to that now, that that should be
reserved for trial. And therefore, the issue of
contempt on that issue is reserved for trial. That
there would need to be information presented to the
Court as to the market value of that note, maybe at the
time of the Decree but certainly at the time it was
9

sold, and what attempts were made to sell it and
whether it was discounted inappropriately.
(R. 451-452).
22.

During the trial regarding the above-stated issue

on October 15, 1993 the trial court stated on a couple of
occasions that Mr. Hammond was not restricted by the Decree of
Divorce from selling or transferring the HHEICO contract.

(R.

676 and 679).
23.

On one such occasion trial court stated:

"Well,

that's not entirely correct though, Mr. Hanks, because the Decree
says that he is entitled to sell the note."
24.

(R. 679).

Mr. Hammond testified that, based in part upon

proceedings during the pendency of the divorce action, he
understood that he could sell or transfer said contract and that
Mrs. Dennison did not have any interest in the HHEICO contract.
(R. 693, 736, 745-746 and 755-756.).
25.

There was no evidence presented by Mrs. Dennison

at the time of trial regarding the fair market value of the
HHEICO contract and, instead, Mrs. Dennison argued that the
remaining balance of the contract was its fair market value.

(R.

624-674 and 677-679).
26.

The only evidence regarding the fair market value

of the HHEICO contract was the testimony of Mr. Poulsen that he
paid approximately $30,000.00 for the contract (R. 763) and the
testimony of Mr. Hammond.
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27.

There was no evidence of the amount that the

parties or Mrs. Dennison would have received under the HHEICO
contract.

(R. 624-698 and 704-771).
28.

There was evidence from Mr. Hammond and Mr.

Poulsen that it appeared that the contract might be paid off
before the end of the contract.

(R. 754 and 764-765).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mr. Hammond did not know that he did not have the right
to transfer the HHEICO contract and did not knowingly and
wilfully violate any court order.

Because of his financial

circumstances he did not have the ability to perform the alleged
court order.
There was no evidence of the damages suffered by Mrs.
Dennison except speculation by the court that the HHEICO contract
would not be paid off prior to amortized payment schedule.
Accordingly, the court exceeded its power in ordering Mr. Hammond
to pay Mrs. Dennison payments of $505.05 per month for 218
months.

No evidence was presented of obstinacy and, accordingly,

the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Mr. Hammond to
serve 30 days in jail for doing that which he thought he had the
right to do.
No evidence was presented regarding whether the HHEICO
contract was inappropriately discounted and Mrs. Dennison's case
should have been dismissed at the conclusion of her presentation
of evidence.

There are no findings and no evidence regarding Mr.

Hammond's ability to pay Mrs. Dennison's attorney's fees and the
11

reasonableness of said fees and, accordingly, said award should
be reversed and Mr. Hammond should be award his attorney's fees
incurred herein.
ARGUMENT
I.

MR. HAMMOND IS NOT IN CONTEMPT OF ANY COURT ORDER.

In Utah Farm Production Credit Ass'n v. Labrum, 762 P.2d
1070, 1074 (Utah 1988) the Utah Supreme Court stated as follows:
To be held in contempt, a party must have (1) known of
the duty imposed by the court's order, (2) had the
ability to comply with the order, and (3) willfully and
knowingly refused to comply.
In Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Utah 1988) the Utah
Supreme Court stated that: "These three elements must be proven .
. . by clear and convincing evidence in a civil contempt
proceeding."

In the instant matter Mrs. Dennison has not proven

any of the three elements by clear and convincing evidence.
A. The Decree of Divorce does not impose a duty by its language
to not sell, transfer or encumber the HHEICO contract.
The simple existence of the trial court7s ruling on
August 11, 1993 that the Decree of Divorce does not restrict Mr.
Hammond from selling or transferring the HHEICO contract
demonstrates that the Decree of Divorce does not impose by its
language a known duty to not encumber the HHEICO contract.

If

such a duty were sufficiently stated in the Decree of Divorce the
trial court would not have ruled, after extensive briefing and
argument, that the Decree of Divorce did not restrict Mr. Hammond
from selling or transferring the HHEICO contract.

12

The above-described issue was argued in Mr. Hammond's
objection to the commissioner's recommendation, Mrs. Dennison's
response thereto and Mr. Hammond's reply.

It was addressed by

both parties in their presentations to the judge.

It clearly was

fully briefed and explained to the trial court at the time of the
hearing on August 11, 1993.
Mrs. Dennison acknowledges in her Response to
Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend Findings or in the
Alternative for a New Trial that the Court ruled on August 11,
1993 that Mr. Hammond was not restricted from selling or
transferring the HHEICO contract.

(R. 423-424 and 426).

Mrs.

Dennison further acknowledges on page 7 of ^aid response that no,
new material facts were presented at the hearing on October 15,
1993.

(R. 427). The evidence presented at said hearing had

nothing to do with said issue and there was no basis for the
trial court to find thereafter a duty to not sell, transfer,
assign or encumber the HHEICO contract.
Whether the divorce decree is ambiguous is a question
of law which this Court reviews for correctness, according no
particular deference to the trial court's conclusions.
Lyngle. 831 P.2d 1027 (Utah App. 1992).

Lyncrle v.

There is no ambiguity in

the Decree of Divorce in the instant case regarding the HHEICO
contract.

The trial court's ruling on August 11, 1993 so

demonstrates.

Accordingly, the trial court erred if it found

facts respecting the intention of the parties based upon
extrinsic evidence.

However, the trial court appears to have
13

only relied upon the language of the Decree of Divorce.

(R.

707) .
There is no command in the instant Decree of Divorce
that Mr. Hammond refrain from selling, transferring or
encumbering the HHEICO contract.

In Goodover v. Lindey/s Inc.,

847 P.2d 699, 701 (Mont. 1993) the Montana Supreme Court stated
as follows:
If there is no command, there is no disobedience. A
person may not be held in contempt of court for
violating an order, unless the terms of the order are
definite, certain and specific.
In Finding of Fact No. 11 in the instant case the trial court
acknowledges that there is no specific provision of the decree
which contains any such restriction.

(R. 599). Mrs. Dennison's

argument is that Mr. Hammond was suppose to know from the spirit
of the Decree of Divorce.
Furthermore, there was no evidence at all that Mr.
Hammond understood that he was restricted from selling,
transferring or encumbering the contract.

The only evidence

presented by Mrs. Dennison was that Mr. Hammond had knowledge of
paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce and that Mr. Hammond did not
like the language of paragraph 7 but did nothing in regard
thereto because he thought it was too late.

(R. 735-736).

Mr. Hammond testified that he understood that he always
had the right to sell or transfer said contract.

The evidence

was that Mr. Hammond was the sole holder of the promissory note
referred to as the HHEICO contract and always had been the sole
holder.

(R. 718). Mr. Hammond is the original beneficiary of
14

the trust deed which secures said note.

(R. 717). Mr. Hammond

is the sole maker on the senior obligation and the sole grantor
of the senior trust deed securing said obligation.

(R. 719). It

was intended that the HHEICO note remain in Mr. Hammond's
possession and control.

(R. 717-718 and 732).

It was intended

that Mr. Hammond be the only one to receive the payments and that
he be the only one obligated to make the payments on the senior
obligation.

(R. 732) . If no net proceeds were received, then

Mrs. Dennison was not entitled to any proceeds and she never has
had the right to sue the obligor on said note.

All of this

uncontroverted evidence proves that Mr. Hammond, from the
commencement of its existence, has had the right to sell,
transfer or encumber the HHEICO contract.
This was not in any manner changed by the Decree of
Divorce as the Court ruled on August 11, 1993. There is nothing
in the Decree of Divorce that states anything similar to a
restriction regarding the sell, transfer or encumbrance of the
HHEICO contract.

In fact, the Decree of Divorce specifically

contemplates the situation wherein the net amount received is
other than $777.00 per month and provides that Mrs. Dennison
shall receive 65% of the net amount received.

Restrictions could

easily have been placed upon Mr. Hammond if it had been so
intended.

Said restrictions must be there explicitly in order to

create a known duty, which did not previously exist, to not sell,
transfer, assign or encumber said contract.

15

The Law of the Case Doctrine, as applied to prior court
rulings, "expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to
reopen what has been decided."
436, 444 (1912).

Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S.

See, U.C.A. §78-7-19 (1991).

In 21 C.J.S.

Courts §195 (1940) this principle is stated as follows:
[W]here a court has considered and determined a point
in a case, its conclusion thereon becomes the law of
that case, unless or until reversed or modified by an
appellate court . . . . Such a decision, as the law of
the case, is binding on the courts, as well as on the
parties . . . .
In the instant case one of the issues before the trial
court on August 11, 1993 was whether Mr. Hammond was restricted
from selling, transferring or encumbering the HHEICO contract.
This issue was addressed in Mr. Hammond's objection to the
commissioner's recommendation, Mrs. Dennison's response and Mr.
Hammond's reply which were filed with the Court prior to the
August 11, 1993 hearing and courtesy copies thereof were provided
to the Court.

The trial court ruled at that hearing that the

Decree of Divorce did not restrict Mr. Hammond from selling the
HHEICO contact and that the only issue to be tried on October 15,
1993 was the fair market value of the HHEICO contract and whether
it was inappropriately discounted when Mr. Hammond transferred
said contract.
Pursuant to the law of the case Mr. Hammond was not
restricted from selling, transferring or encumbering the HHEICO
contract.

Mr. Hammond, in his attempt to preserve a stable

environment for the minor children of the parties, did not
violate any known duty imposed by a court order when he pledged
16

the HHEICO contract as security for a loan.

Accordingly, this

Court should find, as the trial court stated on several
occasions, that there are no restrictions in the Decree of
Divorce regarding the sell, transfer or encumbrance of the HHEICO
contract.
B. Mr. Hammond did not have the ability to comply with the court
order and did not willfully and knowingly refuse to comply with
the order.
Mrs. Dennison did not meet her burden of proving, by
clear and convincing evidence, that Mr. Hammond had the ability
to comply with the court order.

The evidence presented by Mrs.

Dennison was that Mr. Hammond could have attempted to find a two
bedroom apartment for the amount of approximately $550.00 per
month.

Mr. Hammond testified that he had been unemployed at the

time he borrowed money from Mr. Moench.

He did not have

resources to find other housing and he was trying to preserve a
stable situation for himself and the minor child.
Furthermore, there was absolutely no evidence that Mr.
Hammond willfully and knowingly refused to comply with the Decree
of Divorce.

In Utah Farm Production Credit Ass'n v. Labrum, 762

P. 2d 1070, (Utah 1988) found that an individual must have
knowledge of what is required of him together with acts which are
in violation of that known duty before he has willfully and
knowingly refused to obey a court order. All of the above
uncontroverted evidence demonstrates that Mr. Hammond's frame of
mind was that he could encumber the HHEICO contract.
no evidence of any other frame of mind.
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There was

Accordingly, this Court should find that Mr. Hammond is
not in contempt for doing that which the trial court, on several
occasions, acknowledged that he could do.
C. The findings of the trial court are inadequate to support a
holding of contempt.
The findings herein, as required in Von Hake, are
inadequate for review because they are not "sufficiently detailed
and [do not] include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was
reached."

Rucker v. Dalton. 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979).

In

the instant case there are no subsidiary facts but only ultimate
conclusions.
Finding of Fact No. 9 states that the Decree of Divorce
clearly provides an income stream to Mrs. Dennison, that Mr.
Hammond had knowledge of paragraph 7 of the decree and because he
took no action to amend the decree it suggests that he was aware
that there were limitations on what he could do.

(R. 598-599).

There were no other findings regarding the element that Mr.
Hammond knew what was required of him.
Finding of Fact No. 13 states that Mr. Hammond did not
transfer the HHEICO contract because of financial duress or
compulsion and that Mr. Hammond used his share of the proceeds
from the sale of the home to pay a debt to his mother.

The

finding regarding the use of the sale proceeds to pay a debt does
not in anyway demonstrate that Mr. Hammond had the ability to
perform as required.

Otherwise there are no findings regarding
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Mr. Hammond's ability to perform as required by the Decree of
Divorce.
There are no findings regarding the element that Mr.
Hammond knowingly and wilfully violated a court order.

This

court recently held in State v. Long, 844 P.2d 381, 387 (Utah
App. 1992) that an express finding that an individual acted
willfully, absent the subsidiary factual findings to support that
conclusion, was insufficient and required reversal.

Since there

are no ultimate or subsidiary factual findings in this matter, it
must be reversed.
"[T]he finding of a person in contempt and sentencing
him to jail is of very serious consequence to the person
involved, somewhat akin to a criminal penalty."
Thomas, 569 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Utah 1977).

Thomas v.

"The lack of explicit

findings on each requisite element of contempt, and the lack of
supporting subsidiary findings, cannot be lightly dismissed especially when criminal contempt and incarceration are at
issue."

Kunzler v. O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270, 278 (Utah App. 1993).

The failure thereof in the instant matter requires that said
holding be reversed.
II. THE TRIAL COURT EXCEEDED ITS POWER IN ORDERING MR.
HAMMOND TO REPAY MRS. DENNISON AND TO SERVE 30 DAYS IN
JAIL.
Paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce is the only
provision of the Decree of Divorce which pertains to the HHEICO
contract.

Said paragraph provides as follows:

The plaintiff is awarded sixty-five percent (65%) of
the net proceeds of the HHEICO contract and the
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defendant is awarded thirty-five percent (35%) of the
net proceeds of the HHEICO contract. The current net
proceeds from the HHEICO contract are $777.00 per.(sic)
The plaintiff is entitled to receive $505.05 per month
and the defendant is entitled to receive $271.95 per
month from the HHEICO contract. In the event that the
net amount received from the HHEICO contract shall
differ from the $777.00 per month, then the parties
shall divide the net proceeds sixty-five percent (65%)
to the plaintiff and thirty-five percent (35%) to the
defendant.
The proceeding before the trial court was an order to
show cause not a petition to modify.

The court's ruling, in

part, on the order to show cause was as follows:
The Defendant is ordered to pay Plaintiff the amount of
$505.05 per month, beginning the first day of the month
following the entry of this order, for a period of 218
consecutive months. . . . In the event the Defendant
defaults in his monthly payment obligation to
Plaintiff, the Plaintiff shall determine the net
present value of the balance remaining to be owed to
Plaintiff by discounting the dollar amount by the
contract rate (9.75%) and shall be entitled to a
judgment in that amount.
This ruling of the trial court clearly modifies the Decree of
Divorce.
Rule 6-404(1) of the Utah Code of Judicial Procedure
provides that "No request for a modification of an existing
decree shall be raised by way of an order to show cause."

The

Decree of Divorce provides that Mrs. Dennison is awarded 65% of
the net proceeds of the HHEICO contract.

The trial court

modified said provision and awarded Mrs. Dennison 218 monthly
payments of $505.05 and, in the event of default, a judgment
calculated by determining "the net present value of the balance
remaining to be owed to plaintiff by discounting the dollar
amount by the contract rate (9.75%) . . . ."
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There was no

evidence that the above provision represents the damages suffered
by Mrs. Dennison except speculation by the court that the HHEICO
contract would not be paid off prior to amortized payment
schedule.

Accordingly, the court exceeded its power and this

provision should be removed from the order of the court.
No evidence was presented of "obstinacy in
disobedience", Thomas v. Thomas, 569 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Utah 1977),
and, accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in
ordering Mr. Hammond to serve 30 days in jail for doing that
which he thought he had the right to do.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING MR.
HAMMONDS MOTION TO DISMISS.
At the conclusion of Mrs. Dennison7s case at the
hearing on October 15, 1993 Mr. Hammond moved the court for a
directed verdict of no cause of action which the trial court
denied.

(R. 674). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial

court is obligated to look at the evidence and all reasonable
inferences that fairly may be drawn therefrom in the light
favorable to the party moved against and determine if plaintiff
has convincingly shown a right to relief and on appeal the
reviewing court looks at the evidence in the same manner.
Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308 (Utah 1983).
In the instant case the issues before the court at the
hearing on October 15, 1993 were whether the note was discounted
inappropriately in violation of the Decree and the issue of
contempt on that issue.

The trial court instructed that there

would need to be information presented to the court as to the
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market value of that note, maybe at the time of the Decree but
certainly at the time it was sold, and what attempts were made to
sell it and whether it was discounted inappropriately,

(R. 451-

452) .
At the trial the evidence presented by Mrs, Dennison
consisted of her explanation of what the HHEICO contract was, the
amount which she had received each month from Mr. Hammond and her
statement that Mr. Hammond had never explained to her why he was
not making payments to her.

Mr. Hammond was called by Mrs.

Dennison and he testified that he had read the Decree of Divorce,
that his understanding was that when payments were made to him he
would pay 65% to Mrs. Dennison, that $274,993 was owing subject
to a prior obligation to First Security in an unknown amount,
that he did not tell Mrs. Dennison when he no longer owned the
HHEICO contract, that he stopped making payments to Mrs. Dennison
when he no longer received payments, that the HHEICO contract was
lost when he assigned it in order to borrow some money in an
attempt to not be required to sell the home where he resided with
the parties' minor child, that he did not have the financial
ability to pay Mrs. Dennison 65% of the $25,000.00, that he had
tried to obtain a loan to pay said amount to Mrs. Dennison. Mrs.
Dennison was allowed to introduce an amortization schedule of the
face amount of the HHEICO contract which did not include an
amortization of the senior obligations and a schedule of payments
over the objection of Mr. Hammond.
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Finally, Mr. Hanks testified

regarding the amount of attorney's fees charged to Mrs. Dennison
and that said total amount was reasonable.
Absolutely no evidence was presented on whether the HHEICO
contract was discounted improperly and, accordingly, there was no
evidence that Mr. Hammond was in contempt of a court order to not
improperly discount the HHEICO contract.
IV. MRS. DENNISON IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES.
In an action to enforce the provision of a decree of
divorce, the trial court has discretion to award attorney's fees.
Lynale v. Lyncrle. 831 P.2d 1027 (Utah 1992).

In said action the

court may disregard the financial need of the requesting party.
Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843 (Utah App. 1994).
Accordingly, the trial court in the instant case must make
adequate findings regarding the ability of Mr. Hammond to pay and
the reasonableness of the requested fees.
P.2d 272 (Utah App. 1993).
such findings.

Potter v. Potter, 845

In the instant case there were no

The only finding regarding attorney's fees is

Finding of Fact No. 17 which does not contain any finding
regarding reasonableness or the ability of Mr. Hammond to pay the
requested fees.

(R. 601). Accordingly, this court should reverse

the award of attorney's fees to Mrs. Dennison.
The evidence regarding the attorney's fees incurred by
Mrs. Dennison is simply a lump sum without any itemization and,
therefore, there is no way to determine if it is reasonable.
Because the evidence is in this form, the court cannot separate
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out any amounts for various services, and, therefore, should not
award any fees to Mrs. Dennison.
It is an abuse of discretion to award Mrs. Dennison
attorney's fees when she did not prevail and, in fact, should not
prevail on any aspect of her order to show cause.

The Verified

Motion for Order to Show Cause contained eight issues. Mrs.
Dennison prevailed at the trial court on two of said issues.

One

issue, regarding the cemetery lots, was not properly part of the
proceeding as Mrs. Dennison has never attempted to do anything
regarding the cemetery lots.
In regard to the issues regarding contempt and the
order of the court regarding payments to Mrs. Dennison, Mr.
Hammond is not in contempt and Mrs. Dennison is not entitled to
said payments.

Accordingly, Mrs. Dennison did not prevail and

should not be awarded any attorney's fees for having brought the
contempt proceeding.

Mr. Hammond should be awarded his

attorney's fees and costs herein.
CONCLUSION
"[T]he criminal contempt power should only be used to
sanction deliberate contumacious acts or omissions.

As the

United States Supreme Court has observed: xThe very amplitude of
the [contempt] power is a warning to use it with discretion, and
a command never to exert it where it is not necessary or
proper.'"

State v. Long, 844 P.2d at 387 (quoting Gompers v.

Buck's Stove & Range Co.. 221 U.S. 418, 451, 31 S.Ct. 492, 502
(1911).

No deliberate contumacious acts exist herein.
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In the

instant case there was no clear and convincing evidence of a
known duty imposed by the court's order; the ability to comply
with the order; and willfully and knowingly refusing to comply
with said order.

The simple existence of the trial court's

ruling on August 11, 1993 demonstrates that the Decree of Divorce
does not impose a known duty by its language to not sell,
transfer or encumber the HHEICO contract.

Furthermore, the law

of the case prevents the Court from now ruling that Mr. Hammond
is in contempt for an act which it previously ruled he could do.
Finally, the findings of the trial court are inadequate to
support its holding of contempt.
It was improper for the trial court to modify the
Decree of Divorce and it exceed its power in ordering Mr. Hammond
to make payments to Mrs. Dennison and in ordering a judgment in
the event of default.

Mr. Hammond should not be required to pay

Mrs. Dennison any amounts for the sale of the Pontiac automobile.
Since Mrs. Dennison did not prevail on her order to show cause,
she should not have been awarded any attorney's fees.
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of September,
1994.

DAVID J. HODGSON
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) copies of the
foregoing to James B. Hanks, Judge Building, Suite 740, Salt Lake
City, UT

84111-2204 this 26th day of September, 1995.
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ADDENDUM A
Decree of Divorce
and
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BERDENE D. HAMMOND,
DECREE OF DIVORCE
Plaintiff,
Civil Number: 894904063DA

v.
DON LEE HAMMOND,
Defendant.

Judge Anne M. Stirba

The above matter came before the court on April 12, 1991,
the Honorable Anne M. Stirba, Judge presiding for trial.

The

plaintiff was present in person and represented by counsel John
B. Mason of Cohne, Rappaport & Segal. The defendant was present
in person and represented by counsel Jimi Mitsunaga.

The court

having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law does now enter its Decree of Divorce as follows:

DECREE QF DIVORCE
1.
against

Each of the parties are awarded a Decree of Divorce
the

other

upon

the

grounds

of

irreconcilable

differences.
2.

The parties shall have joint legal custody of the two

(2) minor children of the parties, to wit:

Sherry Hammond, born

June 5, 1974 and Denise Hammond, born June 16, 1978 and the
plaintiff

shall

be

awarded

sole

physical

custody

of the

children.

The defendant is entitled to reasonable visitation

and the exact days and times of visitation shall be agreed upon
by the parties in the best interest of the children.

In the

event the parties cannot agree upon the exact days and times of
visitation, then the defendant is awarded visitation with the
minor children on alternate weekends beginning Friday at 6:00
p. m. and returning the children to plaintiff on Sunday by 6: 00
p.m.

The defendant is awarded visitation one (1) evening per

week commencing at 5: 00 p. m. and terminating at 8: 00 p. m.

The

defendant is awarded visitation on alternate holidays and on
father7 s day and defendant' s birthday.

The defendant is awarded

visitation beginning Christmas day at 1: 00 p. m. and continuing
through one-half (1/2) of the children's total Christmas school
vacation.

Defendant is awarded visitation for Thanksgiving in

even-numbered

calendar

years

commencing

Wednesday until 6: 00 p. m. on Sunday.

at

6: 00

p. m.

on

Defendant is awarded

visitation for Easter in odd-numbered years commencing at 6: 00
p. m. on Friday until

6: 00 p. m. on Sunday.
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Holidays take

precedence over the weekend visitation and no changes shall be
made to the regular rotation of the alternating weekend schedule
because of holidays.

Defendant is awarded visitation for four

(4) continuous weeks during the children's summer vacation.
Defendant shall provide written notice of the dates to plaintiff
at least thirty

(30) days in advance of the four (4) week

period.
3.

The defendant will pay to the plaintiff child support

in the amount of $163. 52 per month per child for a total of
$327.04 per month.

The defendant shall pay child support for

the parties minor children until said children die, marry or
reach the age of eighteen (18) and graduate from high school
with their regularly scheduled class, whichever occurs first.
Child support will be paid through the Office of Recovery
Services in one (1) lump sum on or before the 5th day of each
month.
4.

If either the plaintiff or defendant is able to obtain

health and accident insurance through their place of employment
then the party who is able to obtain the coverage for the lowest
cost shall provide the insurance coverage.

In the event the

plaintiff is unemployed or is unable to obtain health and
accident insurance through her place of employment, then the
defendant shall provide health and accident insurance for the
benefit of the minor children of the parties.

Any medical or

dental expenses incurred for the children which are not paid by
the policy of insurance shall be shared equally by the parties.
3

The plaintiff is ordered to provide to the defendant medical and
dental expense records for the years 1990 and 1991 which were
not covered by health and accident insurance and the defendant
is ordered to pay one-half (1/2) of the uncovered expenses. The
defendant shall continue in full force and effect his existing
life insurance policy in the amount of $38,000.00.

He shall

designate the minor children as beneficiaries of the policy and
shall name his mother, Jane Hammond, as Trustee for the children
under the policy.

The defendant is ordered to maintain such

policy until the defendant is no longer required to pay child
support.
5.

The defendant is ordered to pay the debt due on his

life insurance policy to Beneficial Life Insurance Company and
he shall hold the plaintiff harmless therefrom.

Any debt due by

the plaintiff on any policy of insurance on her life shall be
paid by plaintiff and she shall hold the defendant harmless
therefrom.
6.

The plaintiff waived any right she may have to alimony

and therefore no award of alimony is made by this court.
7.

The plaintiff is awarded sixty-five percent (65%) of

the net proceeds of the HHEICO contract and the defendant is
awarded thirty-five percent (35%) of the net proceeds of the
HHEICO contract.

The current net proceeds from the HHEICO

contract are $777.00 per.

The plaintiff is entitled to receive

$505.05 per month and the defendant is entitled to receive
$271. 95 per month from the HHEICO contract.

In the event the
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net amount received from the HHEICO contract shall differ from
the $777.00 per month, then the parties shall divide the net
proceeds sixty-five percent (65%) to the plaintiff and thirtyfive percent (35%) to the defendant.
8.

The home located at 2440 Vail Circle, Sandy, Utah

94092 shall be listed for sale until it is sold.

The listing

price shall initially be determined by Mr. Fred Law, the realtor
with whom the property is currently listed.

Upon sale of the

property, any equity after payment of the mortgage and any liens
on the property and payment of realtor' s fees and any other
costs associated with the sale of the home shall be divided onehalf (1/2) to the plaintiff and one-half (1/2) to the defendant.
During the time the home is for sale and until the sale of the
home occurs, the plaintiff shall not cohabit with anyone in the
home.

In the event the plaintiff cohabits in the home then the

defendant' s equity shall be determined as of that date and the
plaintiff shall make immediate payment to the defendant of the
net equity to which he would be entitled after deducting the
mortgage and any other liens against the property and after
deducting any realtor' s fees and any costs associated with the
sale of the property.

The current monthly mortgage payment on

the home is $987.00 per month.

The defendant shall immediately

bring current the house payments, however, the defendant shall
not be required to make house payments that are in arrears in an
amount that exceeds $2,961.00, the equivalent of three (3)
monthly payments.

The plaintiff shall continue to have the
5

right to reside in the home until such time as the home is sold.
Commencing May 1, 1991/ the defendant shall pay one-half (1/2)
of the monthly mortgage payment in the amount of $493.50 and the
defendant shall pay one-half

(1/2) of the monthly mortgage

payment in the amount of $493.50.
9.

It is ordered that each party shall retain his or her

own respective IRA accounts, retirement accounts, pension plans,
profit sharing plans, stocks, bonds and/or other securities.
10.

Each party is awarded one (1) of the cemetery lots.

11.

Any previous

judgments

obtained

by the plaintiff

against the defendant arising out of this action are considered
to be satisfied.
12.

Each party is awarded the personal property in their

respective possessions with the exception that the defendant
will receive the following:

orange couch, love seat, rocking

chair, lamp, vespa scooter, and one-half

(1/2) of the food

storage.
13.

The 1988 Toyota automobile is awarded to the defendant

subject to any debt thereon and he shall hold the plaintiff
harmless

therefrom.

The

plaintiff

is

awarded

the

1988

Mitsubishi automobile subject to any debt thereon and she shall
hold

the

automobile

defendant
shall

be

harmless
sold

therefrom.

to

the

parties

The

1978 Pontiac

daughter

for a

reasonable amount and the proceeds divided fifty percent (50%)
to the plaintiff and fifty percent (50%) to the defendant.
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14.

The

defendant

is

ordered

to

assume

and

pay

the

obligation owed to Jane Hammond in the approximate principal
amount of $5, 100. 00 and he shall hold the plaintiff harmless
therefrom.
15.

Each party is ordered to be responsible for his or her

own debt incurred subsequent to the date of separation, that
date being November 1, 1989, and that each is ordered to hold
the other harmless therefrom.
16.

With respect to the condominium described as Unit

105, Building D, Sunwest Resort, Springdale, Utah, the parties
shall each be responsible for any deficiency pursuant to the
documents they may have previously executed with the lender on
the property or according to law.
17.

The issue of contempt relating to the defendant is

hereby dismissed.
18.

The defendant is ordered to pay to plaintiff one-half

(1/2) of the 1989 federal tax refund or the amount of $750.00
and plaintiff shall have judgment against the defendant for that
amount.
19.

The defendant is ordered to pay one-half (1/2) of the

attorney7 s fees incurred by the plaintiff, that being the amount
of $4,591. 75 and that the plaintiff shall have judgment against
the defendant in said amount.
20.

The defendant is ordered to assume and pay his own

attorney' s fees.
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DATED this

7\^r

day of May, 1991.
BY THE COURT: :

Anne M.. ^ f e i r ^ ^
DistrictSJT^""- "^

to form:

y/^/f/
Jimi Mitsunaga
Attorney for Defendant
(hammond. dec/kk)
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BERDENE D. HAMMOND,
Plaintiff,

]
>
]1

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

;i Civil Number: 894904063DA

v.

DON LEE HAMMOND,
Defendant.

i

Judge Anne M. Stirba

The above matter came before the court on Friday, the 12th
day of April, 1991, at the hour of 9: 00 a. m. , the Honorable Anne
M. Stirba, Judge presiding for trial. The plaintiff was present
in person and represented by counsel John B. Mason of Cohne,
Rappaport & Segal.

The defendant was present in person and

represented by counsel, Jimi Mitsunaga. The parties represented
to the court that they had entered into an oral agreement in
settlement

of all issues brought before the court by the

complaint of the plaintiff and the counterclaim of the defendant
except for the issues of attorney7 s fees and distribution of the
parties 1989 federal tax refund.
of the oral agreement.

The parties advised the Court

The court having considered the oral

agreement and finding it reasonable in its terms did approve the
settlement entered into between the parties.

The court then

proceeded on April 12 to try the issues of attorney' s fees and
distribution

of

the

1989

tax

return.

The

court

having

considered the testimony of the witnesses presented, having
reviewed the exhibits admitted into evidence, the pleadings on
file herein and now being well advised in the premises does
enter its Findings of Pact and Conclusions of Law as follows:

FINDINGS QF FACT
1.

The parties herein were residents of Salt Lake County,

State of Utah

for more than three

(3) months

immediately

preceding the filing of this action.
2.

The parties are husband and wife having been married

on September 3, 1965, in Salt Lake City, Utah.
3.
they

During the marriage the parties reached a point where

could

no longer

live

together.

The parties

became

unsupportive of each other and the differences which arose
between the parties became wholly irreconcilable.
4.

There were four (4) children born as issue of the

marriage, two (2) of whom are minor children, to wit:

Sherry

Hammond, born June 5, 1974; and Denise Hammond, born June 16,
1978.

The parties

have

entered

into

the

following

oral

agreement regarding the issues of custody and visitation, which
oral agreement is confirmed and accepted by the court and shall
be made a part of the Decree of Divorce to be entered in this
2

matter.

The oral agreement is that the parties shall have joint

legal custody of the children and the plaintiff shall be awarded
sole physical

custody of the children.

The defendant is

entitled to reasonable visitation and the exact days and times
of visitation should be agreed upon by the parties in the best
interest of the children.

In the event the parties cannot agree

upon the exact days and times of visitation, then the defendant
is awarded visitation with the minor children on alternate
weekends

beginning

Friday

at

6: 00 p. m.

children to plaintiff on Sunday by 6:00 p.m.

and

returning the

The defendant is

awarded visitation one (1) evening per week commencing at 5:00
p. m. and terminating at 8: 00 p. m.
visitation

on alternate

defendant' s birthday.

holidays

The defendant is awarded

and

on

father' s day and

The defendant is awarded visitation

beginning Christmas day at 1: 00 p. m. and continuing through onehalf (1/2) of the children's total Christmas school vacation.
Defendant

is

awarded

visitation

for Thanksgiving

in even-

numbered calendar years commencing at 6: 00 p. m. on Wednesday
until 6: 00 p.m. on Sunday.

Defendant is awarded visitation for

Easter in odd-numbered years commencing at 6: 00 p.m. on Friday
until 6: 00 p. m. on Sunday.

Holidays take precedence over the

weekend visitation and no changes should be made to the regular
rotation
holidays.
continuous

of

the

alternating

Defendant
weeks

is

during

weekend

awarded
the

schedule

visitation

children' s

because

for

summer

four

of
(4)

vacation.

Defendant shall provide written notice of the dates to plaintiff
3

at least thirty

(30) days in advance of the four (4) week

period.
5.

The parties have orally agreed that the defendant will

pay to the plaintiff child support in the amount of $163. 52 per
month per child for a total of $327. 04 per month.

The court has

reviewed the oral agreement relating to the issue of child
support and finds that the amount to be paid as child support
does conform to the guidelines required by Utah Code Annotated,
Section 78-45-7, et seq.

The defendant shall pay child support

for the parties minor children until said children die, marry or
reach the age of eighteen (18) and graduate from high school
with their regularly scheduled class, whichever occurs first.
Child support will be paid through the Office of Recovery
Services in one (1) lump sum on or before the 5th day of each
month.
6.

The parties have reached an oral agreement relating to

the issues of health and medical care for the minor children as
well as provisions for life insurance.

The parties have agreed

that if either the plaintiff or defendant is able to obtain
health and accident insurance through their place of employment
that the party who is able to obtain the coverage for the lowest
cost shall provide the insurance coverage.

In the event the

plaintiff is unemployed or is unable to obtain health and
accident insurance through her place of employment, then the
defendant shall provide health and accident insurance for the
benefit of the minor children of the parties.
4

Any medical or

dental expenses incurred for the children which are not paid by
the policy of insurance shall be shared equally by the parties.
The parties have agreed that the plaintiff will provide to the
defendant medical and dental expense records for the years 1990
and 1991 which were not covered by health and accident insurance
and the defendant will pay one-half
expenses.

(1/2) of the uncovered

The parties have agreed that the defendant shall

continue in full force and effect his existing life insurance
policy in the amount of $38,000. 00.

He shall designate the

minor children as beneficiaries of the policy and shall name his
mother, Jane Hammond, as Trustee for the children under the
policy.

Such policy shall be maintained until the defendant is

no longer required to pay child support.

The court finds the

terms of the oral agreement to be reasonable and such terms
should be adopted and incorporated into the Decree of Divorce in
this matter.
7.

The parties have agreed that the defendant will pay

the debt due on his Beneficial Life Insurance Company policy and
will hold the plaintiff harmless therefrom.

The parties further

agree that any debt due by the plaintiff on any policy of
insurance on her life shall be paid by plaintiff and she will
hold the defendant harmless therefrom.

The court finds the

terms of the agreement to be reasonable and such terms should be
adopted and incorporated into the Decree of Divorce in this
matter.

5

8.

The plaintiff has agreed to waive any rights she may

have to alimony.
9.

The parties have orally agreed that the plaintiff

should be awarded sixty-five percent (65%) of the net proceeds
of the HHEICO contract and the defendant should be awarded
thirty-five percent (35%) of the net proceeds of the HHEICO
contract.

The parties have agreed that the current net proceeds

from the HHEICO contract are $777. 00 per month.

The plaintiff

shall be entitled to receive $505.05 per month and the defendant
shall be entitled to receive $271.95 per month from the HHEICO
contract.

In the event the net amount received from the HHEICO

contract shall differ from the $777.00 per month, then the
parties shall divide the net proceeds sixty-five percent (65%)
to the plaintiff and thirty-five percent (35%) to the defendant.
The court finds the terms of the oral agreement to be reasonable
and such terms should be adopted and incorporated into the
Decree of Divorce in this matter.
The parties have orally agreed that the home located at
2440 Vail Circle, Sandy, Utah shall be listed for sale until it
is sold.

The listing price shall initially be determined by Mr.

Fred Law, the realtor with whom the property is currently
listed.

Upon sale of the property, any equity after payment of

the mortgage and any liens on the property and payment of
realtor' s fees and any other costs associated with the sale of
the property shall be divided one-half (1/2) to the plaintiff
and one-half (1/2) to the defendant.

During the time the home

6
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is for sale and until the sale of the home occurs, the plaintiff
shall not cohabit with anyone in the home.

In the event the

plaintiff cohabits in the home then the defendant' s equity shall
be determined as of that date and the plaintiff shall make
immediate payment to the defendant of the net equity to which he
would be entitled after deducting the mortgage and any other
liens against the property and after deducting any realtor' s
fees and any costs associated with the sale of the home.

The

current monthly mortgage payment on the home is $987.00 per
month.

The defendant shall immediately bring current the house

payments, however, the defendant shall not be required to make
house payments that are in arrears in an amount that exceeds
$2,961.00, the equivalent of three (3) monthly payments.

The

plaintiff shall continue to have the right to reside in the home
until such time as the home is sold.

Commencing May 1, 1991,

the defendant shall pay one-half (1/2) of the monthly mortgage
payment in the amount of $493. 50 and the defendant shall pay
one-half (1/2) of the monthly mortgage payment in the amount of
$4 93. 50.

The court finds the terms of the agreement to be

reasonable and such terms should be adopted and incorporated
into the Decree of Divorce in this matter.
10.

The parties have reached an oral agreement that each

party shall retain his or her own respective IRA accounts,
retirement

accounts,

pension

plans,

stocks, bonds and/or other securities.

profit

sharing plans,

The court finds the

terms of the agreement to be reasonable and such terms should be
7

adopted and incorporated into the Decree of Divorce in this
matter.
11.

The parties have agreed that each should be awarded

one of the cemetery lots.

The court finds the terms of the

agreement to be reasonable and such terms should be adopted and
incorporated into the Decree of Divorce in this matter.
12.

The parties have agreed that any previous judgments

obtained by the plaintiff against the defendant arising out of
this action shall be considered to be paid in full.

The court

finds the terms of the agreement to be reasonable and such terms
should be adopted and incorporated into the Decree of Divorce in
this matter.
13.

The parties have orally agreed that each should be

awarded the personal property in their respective possessions)
with

the

exception

following:

that

the

defendant

will

receive

the

orange couch, love seat, rocking chair, lamp, vespa

scooter, and one-half (1/2) of the food storage.

The court

finds the terms of the agreement to be reasonable and such terms
should be adopted and incorporated into the Decree of Divorce in
this matter.
14.

The parties have reached an oral agreement that the

1988 Toyota automobile should be awarded to the defendant
subject to any debt thereon and he shall hold the plaintiff
harmless therefrom.

The plaintiff shall be awarded the 1988

Mitsubishi automobile subject to any debt therefrom and she
shall hold the defendant harmless thereon.

The 1978 Pontiac

8
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automobile

shall

be

sold

to

the

parties

daughter

for a

reasonable amount and the proceeds divided fifty percent (50%)
to the plaintiff and fifty percent (50%) to the defendant.

The

court finds the terms of the agreement to be reasonable and such
terms should be adopted and incorporated into the Decree of
Divorce in this matter.
15.

The parties have reached an oral agreement that the

defendant will assume and pay the obligation owed to Jane
Hammond in the approximate principal amount of $5,100.00 and
will hold the plaintiff harmless therefrom.

The court finds the

terms of the agreement to be reasonable and such terms should be
adopted and incorporated into the Decree of Divorce in this
matter.
16.
should

The parties have reached an oral agreement that each
be

responsible

for

his

or

her

own

debt

incurred

subsequent to the date of separation that date being November
1, 1989/ and that each will hold the other harmless therefrom.
The court finds the terms of the agreement to be reasonable and
such terms should be adopted and incorporated into the Decree of
Divorce in this matter.
17.

The parties have reached an oral agreement that they

each recognize that as a result of the foreclosure action taken
on the condominium described as Unit 105/ Building D, Sunwest
Resort/ Springdale, Utah/ that one or both of them may be liable
for a deficiency.

The parties have agreed that they will each

be responsible for any deficiency pursuant to the documents they
9

may have previously executed with the lender on the property or
according to law.

The court finds the terms of the agreement to

be reasonable and such terms should be adopted and incorporated
into the Decree of Divorce in this matter.
18.

The parties have agreed to recommend to the court that

the issue of contempt relating to the defendant be dismissed.
The court/ after considering the recommendation of the parties,
finds that the contempt issue relating to the defendant should
be dismissed.
The court

finds from the evidence presented

that the

plaintiff relied upon the representations of the defendant that
he would split the proceeds of the 1989 federal tax refund in
the amount of $1/ 500. 00 with her when he obtained her signature
on the check.

The court finds that the word "splitting" may not

necessarily mean a fifty/fifty split but in the context in which
the defendant obtained the plaintiff' s signature, the plaintiff
reasonably assumed that the defendant meant that he would give
her one-half (1/2) of the proceeds.

The court finds that the

defendant shall pay to the plaintiff one-half (1/2) of the 1989
federal tax refund in the amount of $750. 00 and that the
plaintiff shall have judgment against the defendant for that
amount.
19.

During these proceedings it has been necessary for the

plaintiff to be represented by counsel.

The court finds that

the time and charges incurred by the plaintiff for attorney' s
fees in the amount of $9,183. 50 in these proceedings were
10

reasonable for the work incurred and within normal community
standards.

The court has read the exhibits, heard the testimony

and is mindful of plaintiff and defendant' s situations regarding
income and debt.

The court finds that the defendant should pay

one-half (1/2) of the attorney's fees incurred by the plaintiff,
that being the amount of $4,591. 75 and that the plaintiff is
entitled to a judgment against the defendant for attorney' s fees
in the amount of $4,591. 75.

The court further finds that the

defendant has the ability to pay the fees and the plaintiff has
need for assistance in paying of the fees.

Further, the court

finds that the defendant is to pay his own attorney' s fees.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, this court does
enter its just and equitable Conclusions of Law as follows:
1.

This court does have jurisdiction to enter a Decree of

Divorce in this matter.
2.

Each of the parties should be awarded a Decree of

Divorce against the other upon the grounds of irreconcilable
differences.
3.

The oral agreements entered into between the parties

should be made a part of the Decree of Divorce which is to be
entered in this matter.
4.

The plaintiff should be awarded judgment against the

defendant in the amount of $750. 00 for her one-half (1/2) of the
1989 federal tax refund.
11

5.

The plaintiff should be awarded judgment against the

defendant in the amount of $4,591,75 for attorney' s fees and
costs she has incurred in this matter.
DATED this C ^ 7 5 \ day of May, 1991.
BY THE >^OUkT: **' £>>

Approv,

to form:

^

rft/ti

^^xui irffT'Mi t s unaga
^
Attorney for Defendant
(hammond. l o l / k k )
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BERDENE HAMMOND,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO. 894904063

Plaintiff,
vs.
DON LEE HAMMOND,
Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on October 15,
1993. The plaintiff, Berdene Hammond, was present and represented
by James B. Hanks.

Defendant, Don Lee Hammond, was also present

and represented by David J. Hodgson.
trial

the

parties

submitted

At the conclusion of the

proposed

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions of Law and post-trial Memoranda. On November 17, 1993,
the matter was submitted to the Court for decision.
This is an order to show cause proceeding initiated by the
plaintiff in which she is seeking a finding that the defendant has
willfully and intentionally violated provisions of the Decree of
Divorce. Specifically, plaintiff claims that defendant

(1) failed

to pay her 50% of the proceeds from the sale of a 1978 Pontiac
automobile as required by paragraph 13 of the decree and (2)
improperly encumbered and eventually lost a contract in which
plaintiff claims she had an interest and from which under the terms
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of the decree she derived a monthly income in the amount of
$505.05.
The Court has now carefully considered the evidence, the
arguments of counsel and the post-trial memoranda.

Based on the

foregoing, and for good cause shown, the Court hereby enters the
following ruling.
Turning first to the issue of the car proceeds, there is no
dispute that the car referenced in paragraph 13 of the decree was,
in fact# sold for $800 and that defendant was obliged to pay 50% of
the sale proceeds ($400) to plaintiff. Defendant claims he did not
violate the decree, however, because at the time of the car sale,
he was providing sole support for the couple's minor children and
did not have the ability to pay a portion of the amounts owed to
plaintiff.
Defendant admits he failed to communicate with plaintiff about
the sale of the car or otherwise attempt to negotiate an offset of
proceeds to her from the child support he was paying.
Based on the evidence at trial, the Court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that defendant knew of his obligation to pay
50% of the car proceeds and that he failed to make good on that
obligation.

However, the Court is not persuaded by clear and

convincing evidence that defendant had the ability to pay the

A ft O o f\ *
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as

required
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because

of his

MEMORANDUM DECISION

then-existing

financial

condition resulting from his being the sole provider for the minor
children.

Accordingly, the Court does not find defendant in

contempt of Court for failing to comply with this provision of the
decree.
Turning next to the contract issue, paragraph 7 of the decree
provides as follows:
The plaintiff is awarded 65% of the net proceeds of
the HHEICO contract and the defendant is awarded 35% of
the net proceeds of the HHEICO contract. The current net
proceeds from the HHEICO contract are $777 per. [sic] The
plaintiff is entitled to receive $505.05 per month and
the defendant is entitled to receive $271.95 per month
form the HHEICO contract. In the event the net amount
received from the HHEICO contract shall differ from the
$777 per month, then the parties shall divide the net
proceeds 65% to the plaintiff and 35% to the defendant.1
The following facts are undisputed.

On or about November

1992, the defendant borrowed $25,000 from David Moench and pledged

1

The HHEICO contract resulted from the sale of an
apartment building in which the defendant had an interest. The
sale took place approximately 15 years ago and the defendant was
given a promissory note to secure his interest.
The note was
assumed by several different parties over the years. On May 29,
1990, and pursuant to a further sale of the note, the defendant was
given an All Inclusive Trust Deed in the amount of $274,993.08.
This note is referred to in the decree as "the HHEICO contract."
Pursuant to the terms of the note, the makers were obligated to pay
defendant the amount of $2,577.46 each month beginning June 20,
1990. After paying various senior notes and encumbrances, $777 was
left as net proceeds to be distributed pursuant to the terms of the
decree.
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the HHEICO contract as security. The defendant borrowed the money
to purchase stock in a gold mining venture which was to produce a
return of $10,000 in 30 days.

The defendant did not inform the

plaintiff he was pledging the HHEICO contract as security, nor did
he make any attempt to obtain her consent to do so. The $25,000
loan was due on or about the first week of January 1993.

The

defendant defaulted on the loan and lost the HHEICO contract to
David Moench.

The HHEICO contract was subsequently sold to the

defendant's brother-in-law.
It is also undisputed that at the time the HHEICO contract was
lost, the balance owing on the contract was $262,951.41, with 218
payments remaining.
At the order to show cause hearing, plaintiff argued that
defendant had no right to encumber the HHEICO contract and that he
should be found in contempt for doing so.

Defendant claimed he

should not be found in contempt of Court because the decree did not
prohibit him from selling, transferring or otherwise disposing of
the contract and that plaintiff was only entitled to receive 65% of
whatever he received per month from the contract.
Based on the Court's review of the evidence, the Court hereby
rejects defendant's argument and specifically finds by clear and
convincing evidence that defendant knew of the plaintiff's interest
in the contract as set forth in the decree and that she was

00530;;
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clearly and unambiguously sets forth the relative interests in the
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There

no language whatsoever in
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defendant was not

entitled to undermine the interest of plaintiff

in the HHEICO
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The Court therefore specifically finds by clear and convincing
evidence that defendant willfully and intentional]
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consent or knowledge.
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, the Court hereby finds
the defendant
With regard
specifical]

contempt
to

appropriate

sanction,

the Court

hereby

at the balance owing on the contract
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reasonably could expect
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" payments
receive

remaining , to
$505.05

per

which

was

plaintiff

month. 2

Defendant
argued that the decree recognized
the
possibility that the actual
monthly proceeds might vary and,
therefore, plaintiff should not receive a flat $505.05 per month.
While this may be true, the only evidence before the Court is that
the monthly payments were coming in as originally contemplated in
the decree. Moreover, to the extent there is any uncertainty about
what the future payments will be, it is defendant who through his
misconduct has created that uncertainty and in an equitable
proceeding as this i s, he cannot benefit from hi s own misconduct.
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Finally, plaintiff relied on the HHEICO contract payments for her
support.
Accordingly, the defendant is ordered to pay plaintiff the
amount of $505.05 per month, beginning the first day of the month
following the entry of the final order in this matter, for 218
months, for a total equal to the amount that plaintiff would have
received under the HHEICO contract had the defendant not lost it of
$110,100.90 ($505.05 X 218 = $110,100.90).
The defendant is further ordered to serve 30 days in the Salt
Lake County Jail for his contempt of Court.

The jail sentence

shall be suspended so long as defendant complies in a timely manner
with the payment provisions set forth above.

In the event he

defaults in any of these conditions, he shall be ordered to serve
all 30 days without any further suspension.
Also, in the event the defendant defaults in his monthly
payment obligation to plaintiff, the plaintiff shall determine the
net present value of the balance remaining to be owed to plaintiff
by discounting the dollar amount by the contract rate (9.75%) and
shall be entitled to a Judgment in that amount.

So long as

defendant is current in his monthly obligations, plaintiff shall be
stayed from executing on the Judgment.
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Plaint il ! is .IIMJ awarded her reasonable,:1 .ii'iiil necessar
incurred attorney's fees and costs in connection with this matter,
which

Court finds to be $2#008.35.

Plaint

,r

s counsel

> prepare

F indings ol

Fart and

Conclusions of Law and Order consistent with this ruling
Dated this

ANNE M.
DISTRICT
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this I $& day of
January, 1994:

James B. Hanks
Attorney for Plaintiff
376 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
David J, Hodgson
Attorney for Defendant
2102 East 3300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
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3
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5
6

THE COURT: All right.

Thank you, counsel,

Ms. Dennison and Mr. Hammond.
Well, I do appreciate the thoroughness in which

7

counsel have presented this matter to the Court.

And the

8

matter is whether Mr. Hammond is in contempt of court for the

9

conduct that's been discussed here today.

The burden is on

10

Ms. Dennison to establish by clear and convincing evidence

11

that, first of all, that Mr. Hammond knew he had this

12

obligation, that he knew that he could not encumber the

13

HHEICO contract or lose the HHEICO contract as he has said,

14

that there has been a knowing and willful failure to comply

15

with that obligation.

16

the evidence that's been presented to the Court on this issue

17

or previously and now here today.

18

Court is prepared to rule.

19

And the Court has considered all of

And based on that the

First of all with regard to the Decree, the Decree

20

clearly provides for an income stream to Ms. Dennison, then

21

Mrs. Hammond, from the HHEICO contract.

22

would not receive an income stream from the HHEICO contract

23

was if there was no money from the HHEICO contract.

24

example, if the folks from whom — who are obligated to pay

25

Mr. Hammond under that HHEICO contract, if they did not pay

The only way she

For
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1

uiiuex. m e contract and there were no proceeds from the

2

contract, then Mr. Hammond wouldn't have anything to disburse

3
4

beyond his power.

But certainly t< (tie extent that there was

5

:1

6

entitled to receive 65 percent _i those proceeds.

7

I In it was provided for

Clearly

Decree.

8

The Court is convinced by clear and convincing

9

evidence that Mr. Hammond was nnf- entitled to take action

U

himself to defeat that right.

i

provision in the Decree.

*i**« --as a bargained-for

Both parties were represented

W

counsel.
0

In fact, M~

Hammond indicated that when he

,

obtained the Divorce Decree, that he contacted his counsel,

c

and he evidently didn't like the term -•* t u it contract and

0

complained to his counsel

n

4

* * decree.

taken

And clearly the Decree provisions stanc

The

d

:

1

provision suggests,

itself, that he

u

o
^articular contract.

z

h

sought,

r

- example,

ixtu star
m in in MI

I hal

*

'i

lammond

II,I'l fi;:11 e e

t

really entitled to do that because no one knew exactly what
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1

the proceeds were going to be on a month-to-month basis.

2

They were set at the levels they were in the contract because

3

that was the current level at the time of the Decree. But

4

clearly that was contemplated that that might fluctuate and

5

that he is obligated to pay 65 percent.

6

Well, this particular contract was lost because of

7

actions that Mr. Hammond took unilaterally without conferring

8

with Ms. Hammond, without obtaining her consent to alter that

9

term.

And for example, had that gone through and he actually

10

had succeeded in a wise investment and gotten money back,

11

then he would be in a position of having to renegotiate the

12

terms of the Decree, if you will, seek a modification of that

13

because he would no longer be getting the HHEICO contract

14

proceeds of which she's entitled to 65 percent.

15

could have gotten more than $505 or she would have been

16

entitled to less. But he was taking action to unilaterally

17

just fix a monthly payment, even if he were successful. And

18

clearly he is not entitled to do that.

19

Arguably she

It is plain to the Court, it is clear to the Court

20

by clear and convincing evidence, that under the express

21

terms of the provision he had no right to encumber the HHEICO

22

contract, and he had no right to risk losing it.

23

not need to be a specific provision in the Decree to make

24

clear that he was prevented from encumbering the HHEICO

25

contract.

There did

By virtue of the language in the Decree, it's

A

A
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cxecix unau ne was not entitled to encumber that contract.
Therefore, by clear and convincing evidence, the Court finds
3
provide that support as contemplated in the express language
5
circumstances in such a way
7

undermine or negate that

on.
Now, the evidence is also clear that

9

gation

*ras aware
11 is

e v i d e n t l y a couple of m o n t h s after the D e c r e e w a s entered.
i

h e w a s aware of t h e p r o v i s i o n .
Decree.

H e received a nnnv

H e w a s represented b y c o u n s e l .

he

****u a r g u a b l y , even

1

-***- t h e time t h e Decree w a s entered b e c a u s e h e w a s .represented

4

b y c o u n s e l , h e had knowledge of t h i s .

c

^x^.^_ 4-u^ decree was entered, the evidence i s undisputed that

0

he received a cop

1

B u t certainly shortly

of the Decree.

It appears that Mr. Hammond made choices as t~ u~>w
(if i « iji,11

d

nothing compelling him

son-in-law and

action he d i ci wi th regard to that HHEICO contract.

obligation that

"The M>" i s

mother

, . ,

And then

going
i

tc make these payments to Ms. Hammond, and he chose in the
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1

face of all of that to ignore the Court-ordered obligation

2

and then in his discretion pay off these other individuals or

3

attempt to pay off these other individuals.

4

It seems very clear —

in fact, it's more clear

5

today than it was at the previous hearing in the Court's

6

judgment —

7

to maintain that contract.

8

obligation, and that he willfully and knowingly violated that

9

provision in disobeyance of the Court Order.

10
11

that Mr. Hammond —

that there was a clear duty

That Mr. Hammond knew he had this

Therefore, the

court finds that Mr. Hammond is in contempt of court.
With regard to the attorney's fees that have been

12

proffered, the Court finds that Mr. Hammond is obligated to

13

pay those attorney's fees. That they are reasonable and

14

necessarily incurred for the proceedings following the trial.

15

The Court has previously dealt with attorney's fees through

16

the end of the other proceeding, but that these additional

17

proceedings have been necessary consistent with the Court's

18

ruling previously, and that it's been necessary for

19

Ms. Hammond to continue to prosecute this claim.

20

Accordingly, the Court awards the attorney's fees proffered

21

by counsel in this case, and also for costs, if she has

22

incurred any, for this additional proceeding.

23
24
25

Have I overlooked anything, counsel?
MR. HANKS:
needs to do.

Your Honor, as far as remedy, what he

In the prior order of the Court, your Honor,
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had, I believe, ordered him LU pay her $505.50 a month — xii
-• l -i

words, to restore what she had -

-"id you, imposed a

entence

g

i head to get his compliance.

We'd ask for that, and

ldgment

except that I would say that i t is clear, based
Hammond1 s brother-i n- 1 aw , I: hat there
another possible solution,
pp r Q p t

_

to orcjer

_ think that it's
that that happen because I

_.. _ „.iow if Mx. Hammond can obtain that kind of financing.
"*

1§n

* n Y event —

obviously that's a possibility that I

14

w*.^.*A^ .*.** prudence Mr. Hammond ought to consider. And if he

K

^ o o *r* ~an reinstate the HHEICO contract, then obviously
^A*c parties would be back to where they were before the

17

xo
in
20

HHEICO contract was lost.
So, I would just urge Mr. Hammond to consider
4-u~.t. i^-.o. T.._ n o t i nc i u di n g that in the fi nal judgment.
Very well.

Thanh y it . I'mjil "" f. in recess.

21

MR. HANKS: Thank yoil.

22

(This concludes

23

)
*

24
25
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STATE OF UTAH

)

3

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

4

I, SUZANNE WARNICK, CSR, RPR-CM, do certify that I

5

am a Certified Shorthand Reporter, Registered Professional

6

Reporter with the Certificate of Merit, and a Notary Public

7

in and for the State of Utah.

8

That at the time and place of the proceedings in

9

the foregoing matter, I appeared as the court reporter in the

10

Third Judicial District Court for the Honorable Judge Anne M.

11

Stirba, and thereat reported in stenotype all of the

12

proceedings had therein.

13

That thereafter, my said shorthand notes of the

14

Judge's Bench Ruling were transcribed by computer into the

15

foregoing pages; and that this constitutes a full, true and

16

correct transcript of the same.

17
18

WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL in Salt Lake City, Utah on
this, the 7th day of September 1994.

19
20

A

^a^r?^
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22
23
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ADDENDUM D
Order and Judgment
and
and Coi ic] i i s i oi is of I .aw

JAMES B. HANKS (4331)
JAMES B. HANKS, P.C.
Western Financial Center
376 East Fourth South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-2886

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah

Deputy Clerl

Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BERDENE D. HAMMOND,
Plaintiff,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

SRbSHS

vs.
DON LEE HAMMOND,
Defendant.

Civil No. 894904063 DA
Judge Anne M. Stirba

The above-entitled matter came before the Court for trial on
October 15, 1993. The Plaintiff, Berdene (Hammond) Dennison, was
present and represented by James B. Hanks.

Defendant, Don Lee

Hammond, was also present and represented by David J. Hodgson. At
the conclusion of the trial the parties submitted proposed Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and post-trial Memoranda.

On

November 16, 1993, the matter was submitted to the Court for
decision.

On or about January

4, 1994, the Court filed a

memorandum decision in favor of the Plaintiff.

Pursuant to the

Courts ruling, the Plaintiff filed proposed Findings of Fact and an
Order and Judgment.

ftft(P. *ft/»

On or about February 8, 1994, the Defendant filed a "Motion to
Alter or Amend Judgment, or in the Alternative, Motion for a New
Trial."

The Court ruled on the Defendant's Motion on May 16, 1994

and denied the Motion.

The Court did, however, reopen the trial

for "the limited purpose of hearing evidence concerning whether the
Defendant had the right under the decree to encumber the HHEICO
contract, whether he had a right to encumber the contract without
the consent of the Plaintiff, and whether his conduct of pledging
the HHEICO contact without the Plaintiff's consent constitutes
contempt of Court."
Pursuant to the above ruling, the trial was reopened on August
31, 1994.
attorney,

The Defendant appeared and was represented by his
David

Hodgson.

The

Plaintiff

appeared

and

was

represented by her attorney, James B. Hanks.
The Court, having fully reviewed the documents on file, having
heard testimony from the witnesses and being fully informed in the
premises, ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES:
1.

The Defendant is ordered to pay Plaintiff the amount of

$505.05 per month, beginning the first day of the month following
the entry of this order, for a period of 218 consecutive months.
This eguals the amount that Plaintiff would have received under the
HHEICO contract had the Defendant not lost it.

In the event the

Defendant defaults in his monthly payment obligation to Plaintiff,
2
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the Plaintiff shall determine the n e t present value of the balance
remaining to be owed to Plaintiff by discounting the dollar amount
by the contract rate (9.75%) and shall be entitled to a judgment in
that amount.
2.

The Defendant is further ordered to serve 30 days in the

Salt Lake County

Jail

for h i s contempt of Court.

This

jail

sentence shall b e suspended so long as Defendant complies in a
timely manner with the payment provisions set forth above.

In the

event h e defaults in any of these conditions, he shall be ordered
to serve all 30 days without any further suspension.
3.

Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the Defendant for

her reasonable and necessarily incurred attorney's fees and costs
in connection

with

this matter, which

the Court

finds to be

$2,708.35.
4. The Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the Defendant in
the amount of $400 representing her share of the Pontiac sales
proceeds.
Dated this

,
\C\

ft
day of NCSEinBer, 1994.

"£§*~~*l£w

ANNE M. S T I R B A < ^ ^ . ^ . ^ § & '
District Court J u d W ^ w c ? ^ ^ ^
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that on the

day of November, 1994, I mailed,

postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document
to the following:
David J. Hodgson
2102 East 3300 South

Salt Lake City, Utah

84109
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FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah

JAMES B. HANKS (4331)
JAMES B. HANKS, P.C.
Western Financial Center
376 East Fourth South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 255-2886

Deputy Clerl

Attcprney for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BERDENE D. HAMMOND,
Plaintiff,

:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSION OF LAW

:

vs.

:

DON LEE HAMMOND,

:

Civil No. 894904063 DA

:

Judge Anne M. Stirba

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came before the Court for trial on
October 15, 1993. The Plaintiff, Berdene Hammond (Dennison), was
present and represented by James B. Hanks.

Defendant, Don Lee

Hammond, was also present and represented by David J. Hodgson. At
the conclusion of the trial the parties submitted proposed Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and post-trial Memoranda.

On

November 16, 1993, the matter was submitted to the Court for
decision.

On or about January

4, 1994, the Court filed a

memorandum decision in favor of the Plaintiff.

Pursuant to the

Courts ruling, the Plaintiff filed proposed Findings of Fact and an
Order and Judgment.
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On or about February 8, 1994, the Defendant filed a "Motion to
Alter or Amend Judgment, or in the Alternative, Motion for a New
Trial." The Court ruled on the Defendant's Motion on May 16, 1994
and denied the Motion.

The Court did, however, reopen the trial

for "the limited purpose of hearing evidence concerning whether the
Defendant had the right under the decree to encumber the HHEICO
contract, whether he had a right to encumber the contract without
the consent of the Plaintiff, and whether his conduct of pledging
the HHEICO contact without the Plaintiff's consent constitutes
contempt of Court."
Pursuant to the above ruling, the trial was reopened on August
31, 1994.
attorney,

The Defendant appeared and was represented by his
David

Hodgson.

The

Plaintiff

appeared

and

was

represented by her attorney, James B. Hanks.
The Court, having fully reviewed the documents on file, having
heard testimony from the witnesses and being fully informed in the
premises, now makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. This is an order to show cause proceeding initiated by the
Plaintiff in which she is seeking a finding that the Defendant has
willfully and intentionally violated provisions of the Decree of
Divorce. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Defendant (1) failed
to pay her 50% of the proceeds from the sale of the 1978 Pontiac
2
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automobile as required by paragraph 13 of the decree and (2)
improperly encumbered and eventually lost a contract in which
Plaintiff claims she had an interest and from which under the terms
of the decree she derived a monthly income in the amount of
$505.05.
2.

Turning first to the issue of the car proceeds, there is

no dispute that the car referenced in paragraph 13 of the decree
was, in fact, sold for $800 and the Defendant was obliged to pay
50% of the sale proceeds($400) to Plaintiff.

Defendant claims he

did not violate the decree, however, because at the time of the car
sale, he was providing sole support for the couple's minor children
and did not have the ability to pay a portion of the amounts owed
to Plaintiff.
3.

Defendant admits he failed to communicate with Plaintiff

about the sale of the car or otherwise attempt to negotiate an
offset of proceeds to her from the child support he was paying.
4.

Based on the evidence at trial, the Court finds by clear

and convincing evidence that Defendant knew of his obligation to
pay 50% of the car proceeds and that he failed to make good on that
obligation.

However, the Court is not persuaded by clear and

convincing evidence that Defendant had the ability to pay the
proceeds

as

required

because

of

his then-existing

financial

condition resulting from his being the sole provider for the minor
3
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children.

Accordingly, the Court does not find Defendant in

contempt of Court for failing to comply with this provision of the
decree.
5.

Turning next to the contract issue, paragraph 7 of the

decree provides as follows:
The Plaintiff is awarded 65% of the net proceeds of the
HHEICO contract and the Defendant is awarded 35% of the net
proceeds of the HHEICO contract. The current net proceeds from the
HHEICO contract are $777 per. [sic] The Plaintiff is entitled to
receive $505.05 per month and the Defendant is entitled to receive
$271.95 per month from the HHEICO contract. In the event the net
amount received from the HHEICO contract shall differ from the $777
per month, then the parties shall divide
the net proceeds 65% to
the Plaintiff and 35% to the Defendant.1
6. The following facts are undisputed.

On or about November

1992, the Defendant borrowed $25,000 from David Moench and pledged
the HHEICO contract as security. The Defendant borrowed the money
to purchase stock in a gold mining venture which was to produce a
return of $10,000 in 30 days.

The Defendant did not inform the

Plaintiff he was pledging the HHEICO contract as security, nor did
1

The HHEICO contract resulted from the sale of an
apartment building in which the Defendant had an interest. The
sale took place approximately 15 years ago and the Defendant was
given a promissory note to secure his interest. The note was
assumed by several different parties over the years. On May 29,
1990, and pursuant to a further sale of the note, the Defendant was
given an All Inclusive Trust Deed in the amount of $274,993.08.
This note is referred to in the decree as "the HHEICO contract."
Pursuant to the terms of the note, the makers were obligated to pay
Defendant the amount of $2,577.46 each month beginning June 20,
1990. After paying various senior notes and encumbrances, $777 was
left as net proceeds to be distributed pursuant to the terms of the
decree.
4
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he make any attempt to obtain her consent to do so.

The $25,000

loan was due on or about the first week of January 1993.

The

Defendant defaulted on the loan and lost the HHEICO contract to
David Moench.

The HHEICO contract was subsequently sold to the

Defendant's brother-in-law.
7. It is also undisputed that at the time the HHEICO contract
was lost, the balance owing on the contract was $262,951.41, with
218 payments remaining.
8. At the Order to Show Cause Hearing, Plaintiff argued that
Defendant had no right to encumber the HHEICO contract and that he
should be found in contempt for doing so.

Defendant claimed he

should not be found in contempt of Court because the decree did not
prohibit him from selling, transferring or otherwise disposing of
the contract and that Plaintiff was only entitled to receive 65% of
whatever he received per month from the contract.
9.

Paragraph 7 of the Divorce Decree clearly provides an

income stream to the Plaintiff from the HHEICO contract.

The

Defendant was not entitled to take action, unilaterally, to defeat
that right. The Plaintiff's interest in the HHEICO contract was a
bargained for provision in the Divorce Decree.

Both parties were

represented by counsel.
Mr. Hammond indicated that when he obtained the Divorce
Decree, he contacted his counsel because he evidently didn't like
5
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the language set forth in paragraph 7.

However, no action was

taken to amend the decree. The fact that Mr. Hammond complained to
his counsel and was not happy with that provision suggests, in and
of itself, that he was aware that there were limitations on what he
could do with that particular contract.
10.
unilateral

The HHEICO contract was lost because Mr. Hammond took
actions

without

conferring

with

the

Plaintiff

or

obtaining her consent to do the same.
11.

It is plain to the Court, by clear and convincing

evidence, that under

the express terms of paragraph

7, the

Defendant had no right to encumber the HHEICO contract and he had
no right to risk losing it.

There did not need to be a specific

provision in the decree to make clear that he was prevented from
encumbering the HHEICO contract. By virtue of the language in the
decree, it is clear that he was not entitled to encumber that
contract.
12.

The evidence is also clear that the Defendant was well

aware of the obligations and rights set forth in paragraph 7.
received a copy of the decree.
13.

He

He was represented by counsel.

The Defendant did not encumber the HHEICO contract

because of financial duress or compulsion.

The Defendant claimed

that he encumbered the HHEICO contract in an investment designed to
return a large profit so that he could buy out his daughter and
6

son-in-law's interest in a house.

The Defendant also testified

that because the investment went sour, the home was sold he used
his share of the proceeds to pay a debt owed to his mother.

The

Defendant was not compelled or required to do either of the above.
The Defendant was, however, obligated to abide by the terms of the
Divorce Decree which provided a monthly payment to the Plaintiff.
The Defendant ignored his court ordered obligation.
14.

Based on the Court's review of the evidence, the Court

hereby rejects Defendant's argument and specifically finds by clear
and convincing evidence that Defendant knew of the Plaintiff's
interest in the contract as set forth in the decree and that she
was entitled to receive $505.05 per month from the contract or,
alternatively, 65% of the actual proceeds received.

The decree

clearly and unambiguously sets forth the relative interests in the
contract of the two parties.

There is no language whatsoever in

the decree that suggests the Defendant was awarded the contract or
given the right to sell or encumber it.
15. With regard to an appropriate sanction, the Court hereby
specifically finds that the balance owing on the contract was
$262,951.42

with

218

payments

remaining, to which

Plaintiff

reasonably could expect to receive $505.05 per month.2
2

Defendant argued that the decree recognized the
possibility that the actual net monthly proceeds might vary and,
therefore, Plaintiff should not receive a flat $505.05 per month.
7
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16. The Plaintiff relied on the HHEICO contract payments for
her support.
17. The Plaintiff has incurred $2,708.35 in attorney fees and
costs in prosecuting this matter.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Defendant was not entitled to undermine or defeat the
Plainitff/s interest in the HHEICO contract.
2.

The Court specifically finds by clear and convincing

evidence that the Defendant knew of his duty to maintain the HHEICO
contract and willfully and knowingly violated the Divorce Decree by
encumbering the HHEICO contract without the Plaintiff's consent or
knowledge.
3. Based upon the Findings of Fact and the evidence at trial,
the Court hereby finds the Defendant in contempt of Court.

While this may be true, the only evidence before the Court is that
the monthly payments were coming in as originally contemplated in
the decree. Moreover, to the extent there is any uncertainty about
what the future payments will be, it is Defendant who through his
misconduct has created that uncertainty and in an equitable
proceeding as this is, he cannot benefit from his own misconduct.
8

4. The attorney fees and costs incurred by the Plaintiff are
reasonable in amount and were necessarily incurred because of the
Defendant's actions.

Dated t h i s

i2&

"\>eci*vta^
day of Oesbefecr, 1994.

GU.PA

ANNE M. STIRBA
District Court

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that on the

day of October, 1994, I mailed,

postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document
to the following:
David J. Hodgson
2102 East 3300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84109

